Showing posts with label unemployed. Show all posts
Showing posts with label unemployed. Show all posts

Wednesday, October 17, 2012

John Taylor, Pariah Amongst Piranhas

Lots of heat directed at John Taylor for a recent blogpost about financial crisis and recoveries. Check it out:  http://johnbtaylorsblog.blogspot.com/2012/10/simple-proof-that-strong-growth-has.html
Here's an older, better post on the same thing:
http://johnbtaylorsblog.blogspot.com/2012/08/its-still-recovery-in-name-only-real.html
And here's some of the reactions, many of which raise some valid points: http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/17/financial-crisis-denialism/
http://misleadingguidetocurrentaffairs.blogspot.com/2012/10/the-muss-method-and-john-taylor.html

Taylor's argument is that that financial crises needen't cause a prolonged slump in output below its potential. Its true that his methodology in the second post was sloppy. The 1973 oil price shock and the 1981 disinflation were not financial crises. Maybe he is guilty of intellectual malpractice, or of trying to manipulate evidence to make his case stronger. But I find his premise that a prolonged slump in the wake of a financial crisis is unnecessary if policy responds appropriately convincing. Por ejemplo, take these three examples: 1893, 1907, and 2008. These three crises WERE financial crises that did result in economic slumps!                                                                 


We currently have unemployment at about 7.8%, or several points above anyone's best guess of the NAIRU. Consensus opinion is that the labor market is still in disequilbirum, with desired quantity demanded less than desired quantity supplied. What is the mechanism that is supposed to bring the market for work into equilibrium? It's the real wage, or the nominal wage / price level. A coherent story about the slump is that the financial crisis caused credit markets to contract and firms to lower expectations of future earnings. This caused a decline in the demand for labor, but because nominal wages are sticky and the price level did not rise, real wages failed to adjust, so more workers are seeking employment than firms want to use as inputs to production. If real wages were perfectly flexible, they would fall in the wake of the crisis, making workers more attractive to employers and causing the remaining jobless to remain so as a result of their leisure/consumption preferences. We had a demand shock. Prices didn't adjust, so we still have a slump. Monetary and fiscal policy (both changes in taxes and targeted spending) can boost aggregate demand. If they haven't, policy makers should be made to answer why. 
The financial crises and recoveries above demonstrate that it IS possible to have a rapid recovery. Maybe prices and wages were more flexible in the past, so demand shocks were not so disequilibrating. But bold movements on taxes, spending and monetary policy can and should go a long way toward mitigating a slump, whatever its origins. Just because poor past policy in other crises may have lead to slow recoveries doesn't mean current policymakers should get a pass. And those who want to throw up their hands and say "It's just how it is after a crisis" are giving a blank check to those in power. A check drawn on the empty account of the unemployed.

Update: John Cochrane weighs in with what I think is the best commentary yet. Here's my favorite excerpt

"If you conclude "recessions are always long and deep after financial crises" then you're saying policy doesn't really matter...so you shouldn't be advocating different policies! If policies matter a lot to the length and severity of recessions, then "recessions are always deep and long after financial crisis" is a meaningless statistic, and a poor fig leaf of an excuse."

Sunday, October 7, 2012

Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Luddite

Evil, thy name is automation. 
Joseph Stiglitz, a Nobel Laureate, is undoubtedly one of the most brilliant economists alive today. From his work on asymetric information and its effects on microeconomic and macroeconomic decisions to his work at the World Bank and the Clinton White House he has proved himself to be a giant in the field. So I was mightly suprised to read this boneheaded quote, with regard to why the Fed's low interest rate "policy" is bad. 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-policy-has-contributed-to-the-great-economic-divide/2012/06/22/gJQAXTX2vV_story.html

"Today, persistent low interest rates encourage firms that do invest to use capital-intensive technologies, such as replacing low-skilled checkout clerks with machines. In this way, the Fed may still be contributing to a jobless recovery, when we finally do recover."

So additions to physical capital by firms displace workers and kills jobs. If we want to create jobs and end the jobless recovery, we should, I supose, ban purchases of capital equipment by firms and force them to use more labor to produce the same output. Dear God. Actually, I've got a Milton Friedman anecdote right here that's better than my unqualified snark.

"He was shocked to see that, instead of modern tractors and earth movers, the workers had shovels. He asked why there were so few machines. The government bureaucrat explained: “You don’t understand. This is a jobs program.” To which Milton replied: “Oh, I thought you were trying to build a canal. If it’s jobs you want, then you should give these workers spoons, not shovels."

P.S. By the way, I think I know the premise Stiglitz was working with here. Its a micro equilibrium condition that determines how much capital and how much labor a firm will use to hold output constant and minimize costs (hence maximizing profits). It goes like this: 

MPl/w = MPk/r 

Where MPl and MPk are the marginal products of labor and capital and w and r are wages and interest, or the cost of labor and cost of capital. Arithmetically, if you lower r relative to w and hold the marginal products and total output constant, you find it behooves the firm to use less labor and more capital to produce the output. I think Stiglitz extrapolated this single-firm condition into a fallacy of composition to the entire economy, ignoring that increases in investment leads not to displaced labor but to an increase in the marginal product of labor, increased, not decreased, labor demand, and RISING, not constant, output. 

Thursday, September 20, 2012

Kocherlakota may be a Dove, But he Needs to Read his Milton Friedman

So Narayana Kocherlakota, one of the perennial hawks on the FOMC, has revealed himself to be a dove. 
"The new “liftoff plan,” Kocherlakota said, was an alternative to the proposal from Charles Evans, president of the Chicago Fed Bank, in which the central bank would commit to keeping rates exceptionally low until unemployment falls below 7%, only stopping if inflation rises to 3%."

I would add one large adjustment. Basically, it comes down to a question of derivatives. Kocherlakota is advocating using the derivative of the price level as an indicator. He needs to monitor the second derivative of the price level. 
What this means is that instead of an increase in prices, the Fed should watch for an acceleration in prices. This harkens back to the original work on the Philips Curve by Milton Friedman in his 1967 speech to the AEA. Friedman dissproved that there is a long-run tradeoff between inflation and unemployment, despite the statistical appearance of a short-run trade-off.

His reasoning went as follows: as inflation rises, final product prices rise faster than nominal wages which take longer to adjust due to labor contracts. This rise in P relative to W (the nominal wage) leads to a lower real wage or (W/P). The structure of real wages is now lower than the equilbirum value that clears the labor market, creating an excess demand for labor. This leads to faster job growth as employers try to soak up "cheap" labor, and this creates the short-run Philips Curve illusion.

The buck does not stop there, however; workers find that their nominal wages do not command the purchasing power they did now that inflation has caused the price level to rise. So nominal wage contracts are renegotiated upward, so as to return real wages to their equilibrium value. 
Central banks, therefore, can only lower unemployment below the "full employment" level of unemployment if they continually increase the rate of money growth, not merely create a high rate of growth. Final product prices need to rise faster than workers can anticipate, so as to keep real wages below equilibrium and create the excess demand for labor. 

What this means for Kocherlakota is that a high rate of inflation, if it stabilizes, does not indicate that labor markets are in equilibrium. Accelerating inflation, however, is the inicator that labor markets have cleared, and further additions to aggregate employment will only persist as long as the Fed can fool workers.

In short, here's my prediction: Kocherlakota's 5.5% unemployment target will only be met if inflation is permitted to rise above 3%. 

Thursday, June 7, 2012

Skills Sharp on Both Sides of the Atlantic!

Mark Thoma has a good post on the lack of evidence of a shortage of skills in the US labor market as a cause of high unemployment and low output. It meshes with what I was saying about Europe a few posts ago, about how producutive Europeans are being kept from work for nominal reasons (more elaboration later). Anyway, its true, on both sides of the pond. Check it out.

http://economistsview.typepad.com/economistsview/2012/06/what-skills-gap.html?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+EconomistsView+%28Economist%27s+View%29


Monday, March 5, 2012

Eurozone inflation =low, Unemployment = high

I'm not making this stuff up. Check it out.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/01/eurozone-economy-idUSB5E7JV02K20120301

I just thought I ought to reiterate this, in case any eurozone policy makers have missed it. (They all frequent this blog, right?)

Tuesday, February 21, 2012

Spanish Unemployment Rises

In other news, Spanish unemployment rises above 22%. Check out the link.


http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-01-27/spanish-unemployment-rises-to-22-9-.html


I mean seriously, 22%? In any sane economic regime, that would be unacceptable. There would be outcry to use monetary and fiscal expansion to grow GDP and create jobs in the way outlined in the two models outlined previously. But the ECB ENDED its expansionary program yesterday, and the periphery countries are all, as is well known, debt constrained. There seems to be no light at the end of this tunnel. And the global economy will suffer for it.


Wednesday, December 14, 2011

...The implications for Eurozone Policy

So here are the implications for the Eurzone situation. As the central bank for the Eurozone, the ECB is in charge of shifting the LM curve so as to reach the IS-LM-FE equilibrium. But now the problem may become apparent to the astute reader. The problem with multiple economies sharing one central bank is that each economy has its own FE curve, its own IS curve, but is expected to share ONE LM curve. And the ECB has happily altered the nominal supply of euros so as to hit an M/P that corresponds to an LM that is at the IS-FE point for Germany. So Germany has recovered from the slump and is enjoying 5.8% unemployment with stable prices. But the LM curve that is at IS-LM-FE for Germany corresponds to an IS-LM that is to the left of FE for Spain. To the left of FE for Italy. To the left of FE for Ireland. (I wish I could create my own damn graphs for this; it would be more clear. Maybe someday.)

Remember before when I said that if IS-LM was to the left of IS-FE, deflation could increase the real money supply (M/P) so as to shift the LM curve to the right? Well that is exactly the solution ECB and German officials have proposed for the periphery countires (they call it "internal devaluation," a term I kind of like). That is fine in principle: if Italian and Spanish and Irish workers would agree to lower nominal wages and firms would slash nominal prices, the real money supplies in those countries would expand; their markets could create their own "monetary expansion" without the ECB creating more nominal money balances.

But the problem here is not theoretical: its practical. Economists since the 1930s have made the observation that in practice, firms are very reluctant to cut nominal prices and workers are very reluctant to accept nominal wage reductions. This is partially explained by the idea that firms and workers have a hard time distinguishing between nominal reductions and real reductions; whatever the reason, the price level is considered "sticky" in the short run. That is why monetary policy that expands the nominal stock of money (the M in M/P) is relied on to shift the LM curve and not reductions in P. So while in theory the periphery should be able to deflate its way to full employment, the reality is that doing so will take an intolerably long time, if it can even be fully achieved.



Plus, there's the issue of debt-deflation...