Showing posts with label money supply. Show all posts
Showing posts with label money supply. Show all posts

Monday, December 24, 2012

A Very Discount Christmas Special: Mises and Hayek are Dead

Austrian economics dominates online amateur economics blogging and commentary. Their views go largely unchallenged because most people who read their stuff agree with it or have better things to do than worry about it. Yes, I have nothing better to do on Christmas Eve than try to start a war with libertarians.

This is actually a rather charming picture and makes the
headline seem morbid and untactful.
The Austrian business cycle theory posits that the business cylce is caused by the monetary authority. So far, so good. As I understand it, the theory is based around the analysis of the so called "boom and bust cycle," with booms preceding and causing the inevitable bust. The monetary authority increases the money supply which in short-order causes an increase in prices (inflation) and a fall in real interest rates. These artificially low interest rates are below the equilibrium real interest rate that would prevail in an "unmanipulated" market, and remain so for an extended period. Firms borrow funds at these interest rates and use the loans to invest in capital projects, which because they are financed at low interest rates are low-quality projects. Later, at some unspecified point in time, real interest rates are revised upward to their equilibrium value and the investment projects, which were undertaken to the point where their rates of return equalled the previous, low, interest rate, are now unprofitable. A recession ensues as firms cancel their "malinvestments," banks write off bad loans made with the initial increased money stock, and workers and capital are reallocated away from investment, which was made excessive, and toward consumption or other sectors. 

To Review:

1. Money Supply Increases 2. Interest Rates Fall 3. Firms Borrow and Make "Malinvestments" 4. Rates Rise Again 4. Malinvestments are liquidated 5. A Reallocative Recession Ensues 6. Rinse Repeat

This all sounds reasonable enough; but as we'll see in part 2, there are fatal flaws that need to be addressed.

Thursday, September 13, 2012

The Fed Joins the Expansionist Choir

Good news come from both sides of the Atlantic! Last week it was Draghi announcing his open-ended debt-swaping operation to lower yields in Periphery debt, and today we have this from Bernanke:


"To support a stronger economic recovery and to help ensure that inflation, over time, is at the rate most consistent with its dual mandate, the Committee agreed today to increase policy accommodation by purchasing additional agency mortgage-backed securities at a pace of $40 billion per month.  The Committee also will continue through the end of the year its program to extend the average maturity of its holdings of securities as announced in June, and it is maintaining its existing policy of reinvesting principal payments from its holdings of agency debt and agency mortgage-backed securities in agency mortgage-backed securities.  These actions, which together will increase the Committee’s holdings of longer-term securities by about $85 billion each month through the end of the year, should put downward pressure on longer-term interest rates, support mortgage markets, and help to make broader financial conditions more accommodative."

It's still not a committment to target Nominal GDP, but at least we're seeing expansion where it counts, from the ECB and the Fed. Its a step in the right direction. 

Wednesday, September 12, 2012

Who's Afraid of Inflationary Finance?

The Germans, of course. I'm a tad late to this party, but now's as good a time as any to jump in. It seems the German central bank (ReichsBundesbank ) has challenged the ECB's newest bond-buying scheme (which to my understanding consists of the ECB selling German bonds and using the proceeds to buy up Italian and Spanish debt to suppress yields) in the German Constitutional Court. Check it out:

http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/the-bundesbank-is-calling-the-shots-now-8125952.html

Apparently, the head of the Bundesbank, Jen Weidsmann, has threatended to resign over what he calls "state financing via the money press." Of course, inflationary finance is a touchy subject for Germans, given its history with hyperinflation from 1921-1924 under the Weimar Republic. And of course, as everyone knows, it's that hyperinflation that lead to the collapse of democracy in Germany and the rise of Hitler!

Except that's not true. Hyperinflation in Germany ended in 1924, when Germany revalued and issued a new currency called the Rentenmark, at an exchange rate of 1,000,000,000,000 reichsmarks = 1 rentenmark.
Hitler was not elected as Chancellor of Germany until the 1932 elections, taking office on Jan. 30, 1933. That's a full nine years after the end of hyperinflation, in the middle of the deflationary Great Depression. Whats the connection between the election of 1933 and an inflation that occurred a decade earlier?

Lets get the history straight, shall we? Inflationary finance did not bring about the Nazis; mass unemployment did. Crushing debt burdens owed to foreigners did. Foreign mandates imposed in a beleagured population did. THAT'S the kind of environment that leads to radical leaders who's messages of spite and hatred can take root.

Friday, June 15, 2012

Money in Europe is TIGHT! (And Interest Rates are a Useless Guide)

I had not been previously able to find the stats to investigate this (even though they were on FRED the whole time, under my incompetent nose). I did a few data transformations (in an attempt to paint the picture I wanted to see in order to create a picture of whats going on. Here's what I came up with.

Two things. 

1. This chart seems to corroborate what Milton Friedman  Scott Sumner always says about interest rates being a piss poor  misleading guide to the stance of monetary policy. I mean, just look at that correlation. Interest-rates plunged along with the growth in the money supply; and that even going by the change in quantity of euros, not a percent of the total! 

2. Europe is clearly literally suffering from contractionary monetary policy; their M2 supply is growing at a vastly slower rate than pre-crisis, again, in terms of quantity, not just rate. 

But hey, interest rates are still low, so money must be easy, right? Right?

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

Does Loose Money cause Lower or Higher Nominal Rates? Revised

Here's a revised chart for the below post, this time going back to the 1960s. I wanted to be able to include the inflationary '70s to constrast with the disinflationary '80s. Enjoy.


Tuesday, June 5, 2012

Does Loose Money Lower or Raise Nominal Interest Rates?

Scott Sumner always quotes Milton Friedman who said something to the effect of "low nominal interest rates indicate that money has been tight, high rates that money has been loose."

I take it by this he was going by the Fisher Equation i = r + π e

Where "loose" money cause expected inflation to rise and hence nominal interest rates; "tight" money does the opposite, while the real interest rate stay constant at the loanable funds equilbrium.

I'd like to do some statistical testing for this hypothesis, and might sometime soon. For now, here is a crude plotting of the M2 money aggregate, percent change year by year, with the 10 year nominal Treasury rate. Enjoy.


Wednesday, May 30, 2012

Are Market Monetarists Right? Part 2

So M2 velocity fell off a cliff around 2008 and has not recovered; the chart in the previous post demonstrates that. For fun, lets review Fisher's Equation of Exchange that gives us a relationship between the money supply, velocity, the price level, and real income:

                                                                      M * V = P * Y
                         
The left hand side of the equation gives us nominal spending and the right hand side nominal income. Holding everything else constant, a fall in V would give us lower P * Y or lower nominal income, i.e. a recession. To avoid that, we expect the Fed to do what is does best... conduct open market operations to expand the money supply M (in this case we're looking at M2). So how much has the Fed expanded M2 in the face of the decline in V? 


Ummm, pardon me, but does anyone else notice how the M2 money supply seems to have been held rather... stable? I mean, stable along its previous trend path? Given the algebra of M * V = nominal spending, looking at these charts I'm thinking some faster M2 growth to compensate for the fall in V would do wonders for our nominal GDP- and hence real GDP and employment, given our assumptin of wage and price nominal ridgitity... more on this later. 

Are Market Monetarists Right?- Could Stabilization Policy be that Simple? Part 1


I was recently explaining to someone why the large increase in the monetary base has not been inflationary nor is it likely to be inflationary for some time due to the fact that the Fed is not having any trouble finding people banks to hold the extra base at constant prices, when it occured to me I had not actually bothered to check to see how money-demand had faired over the course of the crisis. 

Well, here is the velocity of the M2 money supply ( Milton Friedman's my preferred aggregate). Remember the velocity is the inverse of money demand. 


Yep. That's what I expected to see; a huge plunge in M2 velocity from 2008-2009, not followed by an increase as of yet. Also, notice how recessions are always associated with a fall in velocity...

Monday, March 5, 2012

Scott Sumner explains "Market Monetarism"

Scott Sumner at themoneyillusion.com has a good explaination of "market monetarism," the approach outlined earlier that looks at the business cycle through changes in the real money supply and its income velocity. Check it out.




Thursday, February 16, 2012

Another Way of Looking at Things part 2

So using our equation M/P * V(i) = Y we can constrcut a different way of looking at business cycles other than IS-LM-FE, as we have done so far.

With our "monetarist" model, we aren't looking to find the appropriate real interest rate that clears the market for real money balances and loanable funds are full employment. We are instead looking at the real money supply M/P and the "velocity" of that money supply, or how many times each dollar "changes hands" i.e. is used in a transaction in a year.

It stands to reason then, from the above equation, that a decline in Y must either be attributable to a fall in M/P, V, or both. So we need to look at what might CAUSE these variables to decline in value.

Lets start with M/P. A decline in the nominal money supply M would reduce M/P at least in the short run. Theoretically, a decline in the money supply SHOULD lead to a decline in the price-level. But here we come to the fork in the road that divides modern macroeconomists: how QUICKLY do prices adjust? Monetarists and Keynesians say prices are "sticky," as we've seen before. New Classical economists say prices adjust very rapidly, if not instantaneously. For this model, however, we assume prices are sticky. If thats the case, a fall in M will cause a fall in M/P not quickly corrected by a fall in P.

This is, by the way, the basic model Milton Friedman used to describe the Great Depression. He catalogued the fall in the nominal supply of money from 1929-1933 which, in his thesis, combined with "sticky" prices to give us the fall in Y that was the Great Depression. Keep M stable, the story goes, and you stabilize the business cycle.



But lets look at the V(i) term as well. Friedman and most monetarists of his day thought the velocity of money was more or less constant, so that observing M/P was where the action was at. But a decline in the velocity of money is just as able to cause a fall in income Y as a fall in M.

More on this later.

Thursday, February 9, 2012

Another Way of Looking at Things part 1

I normally like to think about the business cycle in term of the IS-LM-FE model described so laboriously below. But lately I've been investigating another apporach taken by Scott Sumner (for one): market monetarism. As well as I can piece together, market monetarism is an udated version of the old monetarism of Milton Friedman: changes in the quantity of money, or the rate of change of the quantity of money, drive the business cycle, i.e. flucations in real output. Let examine how that works.


The workhorse of the market monetarist approach, as near as I can tell, is, surprise! Irving Fisher's Equation of Exchange, which is:


                                                             M x V = P x Q


Where M is the nominal money supply, V is the velocity of money, P is the price level, and Q is real output or real GDP. The equation can be rewritten as:


                                                            M/P x V(i) = Q


Where P is now used to deflate the nominal money supply so as to give the real money supply, and velociy is given as a function of the nominal interest rate which is


                                                          i = r + π e 


Where i is the nominal interest rate equaling the real interest rate plus expected inflation. 


The rewritten form is a bit easier to work with because you can think about the real money supply being multiplied by its velocity to get real income. Less convulted. 


So what about the business cycle? 



Wednesday, December 14, 2011

IS-LM and the Price Level

One criticism that is sometimes made about the IS-LM model is that it neglects the price level. The determinates of the model are the real interest rate and GDP; but the price level IS present in the framework. In the LM function that represents the necessary levels of (r) and (Y) that clear the market for real money balances, the supply function in the market is the real, as opposed to the nominal, money supply.

What this means is that a change in the price level, that is to say deflation or inflation, will shift LM either up or down. The real money supply is defined as M/P, where M is the nominal money supply and P the price level. A fall in P, that is to say deflation, leads to a smaller denominator and hence a larger real money supply. Inflation, that is to say a rise in P, leads to a larger denominator and hence a smaller real money supply. Recall that an increase in the real money supply relative to money demand causes the LM curve to shift to the right; a decrease causes a leftward shift.


This mechanism, where changes in the price level change the real money supply and hence the position of the LM curve, is the mechanism that theoretically allows the LM to reach FE equilibrium without a change in the nominal money supply, that is to say monetary policy. If the IS-LM intersection is left of IS-FE (the interest rate compatible with full employment), a then there will be downward pressure on prices: workers will accept lower nominal wages, and firms will cut nominal prices to move pilled-up inventory. This decrease in P then causes M/P to expand and shift the LM curve to the right until FE is reached. If IS-LM is to the right of IS-FE, then nominal wages and prices will rise (i.e. inflation) and M/P will contract until LM is once again at FE. So the price level does factor into our IS-LM analysis; its just hidden in the LM curve.

But what are the implications for Eurozone policy?

Combining the Models: IS-LM

So now we have two seemingly unrelated markets that are both cleared by the same thing: the interest rate. The IS-LM model, developed by John Hicks in 1936, combines the two. The model relates the interest rate (r) to GDP (or income on a national level) (Y). The two functions are not supply and demand but a downward sloping function representing cominbations of Investment and Saving corresponding to each combination of (Y) and (r). It's downward sloping because as income increases, saving increases relative to investment leading to a lower interest rate. The upward-sloping function is the Liquidity-preference and Money supply function which is upward sloping with relation to income because as income grows, money-demand increases due to the fact that more money is required to carry out more transactions in a larger economy; this causes money demand to grow relative to money supply, causing rates to rise. Yes, this is potentially the most obtuse collection of concepts in macroeconomics and the most convuluted framework ever. It makes more sense to see it put together piece by piece, but I don't have the ability to make the graphs I need myself and Google has failed me yet again.
As you can see, IS and LM intersect at FE, or the Full Employment level of GDP. This graph represents an economy in equilbrium, where the central bank has set the money supply relative to money demand in such a way as to set the LM curve along the IS curve so as to reach full employment and stable prices. If the central bank were to contract the money supply, the LM curve would shift to the left along IS, resulting in a new Y below Y*; in other words, a recession. If the central bank expanded the money supply relative to money demand, LM would move to the right of the current IS-FE point; that would mean an equilibrium point on Y above the FE level, which is to say an inflationary gap.

This brings us to the price-level aspect of IS-LM, and then onto its implicaitons for Eurozone policy. I can hardly wait.

Tuesday, December 13, 2011

Why Monetary Policy Matters Anyway (part 2): Liquidity Preference and the Real Money Supply

So we have established that Saving and Investment are determined by the real interest rate (r) which adjusts to equilibrate the two. However, in an economy in which money is used as a store of value, a complication arises. The rate of interest on a bond is the inverse of the price of that bond: bond prices and interest rates move in opposite directions. In an economy is which the only store of value was bonds, any increase in saving would automatically translate into an increased demand for bonds and hence lower interest rates, like the loanable funds model from before indicates.

But once we introduce money into the picture, things become complicated. Savings can be held in the form of either bonds OR money; bonds earn interest, but money has two advantages. The first is that by holding money balances, savers can speculate that the price of bonds is about to fall, i.e. that interest rates are about to rise (no one would buy an asset that's about to decline in value). The other and more important motive for holding money is the transactions motive: households and firms hold money balances to make short-term purchases and meet short-term expenses. You can't pay the contractor in Treasury bills. 

So money-demand is a function of both the interest rate and income, so that we write Md=f(r, Y). Money-supply is not a function of the interest rate, its a perfectly inelastic line indicating the fact that the supply of money is fixed by the central bank at any given moment. Given that, as in all markets, quantity supplied must equal quantity demanded, we can write MS=md (r, Y). Income and the interest rate adjust to equate the money supply with money demand. This market is described in the below chart. 
As you can see, the central bank moves the interest rate up or down by increasing or decreasing the money supply along the money demand curve. 

So we have two markets, the market for loanable funds and the market for money balances, that are both cleared by the same variable: the interest rate. Whats left to be done is to combine them.